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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 950720-CA 
v. : 
Priority No. 2 
CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY, : 
Oral Argument Not Requested 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Christopher Cheeney appeals the enhanced penalties imposed upon 
his convictions for burglary, a third degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony. The 
underlying convictions, plus the enhancements, for "acting in concert with two or more 
persons," permitted under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), were entered upon guilty 
pleas in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The first and third issues identified by Cheeney are closely intertwined. 
Therefore, the State combines those issues as the first point on appeal, and identifies all issues 
as follows: 
1. Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), which enhances penalties for 
certain crimes committed in concert with two or more persons, a legitimate sentencing statute, 
which does not require that full trial-type procedures be followed in order for the enhancement 
to apply? 
2. Does section 76-3-203.1: (a) give adequate notice of the situations in which 
enhanced penalties may apply? (b) legitimately allow trial court discretion to suspend the 
enhanced penalties? (c) honor First Amendment "association" rights? 
3. Does section 76-3-203.1 comply with federal equal protection and state 
"uniform operation of laws" constitutional requirements? 
The foregoing questions, involving the constitutionality of a statute, are subject 
to appellate review without deference to the trial court's rulings. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 
P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989). However, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality; 
doubts are resolved in favor of validity. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995); State 
v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). See also State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 
(Utah 1989) (statutes must be construed to comply with constitutional framework). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The challenged sentence enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
(1995) is copied in appendix I of this brief. The various constitutional provisions and statutes 
invoked by Cheeney are copied in addendum B to his brief of appellant. Other pertinent 
provisions will be set forth as necessary in the text of this brief. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
f ^eney and two codefendants were charged with four counts of burglary and 
four COU . u u u a • 
criminal information setting forth 'those charges, r-u ^ *ie served notice of intention to request 
sentence eidiaiiceiQnits under Utah Code Ann. § ' u - . - ^ , necause several of the 
charged offenses wen n onmiillnl ill i mm n l w if - 'i& (R. 9-10). 
Enhancements for "in conce- "ink section 76-3-203 tie cmmonly called "gang 
enhancements, * although the statui. _ „ IL . 
Cheeney waived his preliminary hearing (R. 4, 2J-24), and was bound over to 
district court ^ t re h plea bargain, Cheeney pleaded guilty — ~me each of the burglary and 
theft charge m sent, Cheeney 
reserved the right to challenge the const ne "in concert" enhancement statute on 
appeal (R. 36). See'Sta**" c 
/ iiuvcu LU auiKc action 76-3-203.1 as 
unconstitii itunul (R 40, 42-48) Upon in > in w of the parties' memoranda, the trial court 
deni* 
senttiiwn5 II^OLIAAI5 iivm, wi^eupon the wouii ~:— -^LX-Z^J IU concurrent enhanced terms 
of three to five years on the burglary and six to fifteen years on the theft charge. Those 
xOne of the codefendants, Bryan O. Rasmussen, is similarly challenging the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1 on appeal, pursuant to a conditional guilty 
plea. State v. Rasmussen, No. 950521-CA (Br. of Appellant filed 23 February 1996) 
sentences were imposed consecutively to sentences that Cheeney was already serving for prior 
offenses (R. 91-94).2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The burglaries and thefts were committed at several Salt Lake City businesses in 
autumn of 1994 (R. 8-12). The crimes appear to have been systematically planned, for some 
of the stolen property was cached in a storage unit rented to one of Cheeney's codefendants 
under a false name (R. 12). Cheeney confessed his involvement to a law enforcement officer, 
and also identified his co-perpetrators (R. 12). When he pleaded guilty, Cheeney admitted that 
he committed the crimes in concert with two or more other persons (R. 125), thereby 
admitting the factual predicate for the section 76-3-203.1 "in concert" sentence enhancement. 
On appeal, Cheeney pursues his challenge to section 76-3-203.1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The "in concert" enhancement does not create a new substantive offense; nor 
does it for any reason require full trial-type procedures in order to apply. When compared 
with a similar statute that was upheld against a similar "due process" challenge by the United 
States Supreme Court, section 76-3.203.1 also passes constitutional muster. Nor does the 
statute require a mens rea beyond that required for guilt of the predicate offenses to which it 
applies, as demonstrated by a pair of Utah Supreme Court cases; even if such mens rea did 
apply, proof of same would not require full trial-type process. The statute only requires the 
degree of process that is due for sentencing hearings, which was provided in this case. 
2Cheeney committed the burglary and theft while on probation for the prior offenses 
(R. 139-40). 
4 
Cheeoey ' s claim that the statute denies a prel iminary hearing on the " in concert" enhancement 
fails eney expressly waived his prel iminary hearing. Further , reasonable reading 
of the S* ...- _. enhaiicemcNl t an he addiessul ;il 111 crlii*------• ^ ' » n n g . 
Section IV/-J-203.1 also is not unconstitutionally vague. ^ _ „ j n e y ' s vague. . 
claim fails i n par t due to waiver It otherwise fails because it is based upon an inappropriate 
attempt lo grail legislative* hi, umi y mm rnr ^ f u m r nnrn irr1 ni i f I T h n v r history is Improper 
because the statute is unambiguous on its face v : there merit to ( hm»ey s contention that 
section 76-3-203,1 grants too much discretion to ::iw .^iiicn^mg ,uugt 
appropriately cabins the judge 's discretion, three »<**«,** X^JLIIIUIII 
man* also supports the validity of s e c t o r ^6 3-20?. 1. And section 
7:> > _• ass - • . • - s, 
the statute does not reach any constitutionally protected conduct f instead, its appik aiu • is 
limited only to criminal behavior . 
F ! - mu u m i u i m opeiai iun ui iaws" 
argument fails because Cheeney did n :: m :: it z than n :: iiiinally invoke the pertinent constitotional 
provisions in his trial couiI t'jallciiyt: (j --.J|J "" ' ,l111 l l •, ' flu .uguiiieof w n e 
preserved, it would fail because it reli t* U^A,** ^ ^ W ^ v i n i s e s about the meaning of the statute 
and the procedures that are required to implement it, Also, the statute creates no 
const i tnlmiulh " s u ^ i n l ' i I issificatior •" ' il1 y,t ,,y iiiffVrenti,!] (i cat nit1 iif between Ihc 
statutory classiln ill II ins rise to a level I
 w
 ;
 ant scrutin) lliiiii li nl lliii nutute 
need only rationally advance a legitimate pul i concert" enhancment 
satisfies this requirement by more severely punishing group-committed crime, because such 
crime causes more harm than solo crime. 
ARGUMENT 
Overview: Parameters of Review for 
Cheeney's Constitutional Challenges 
Cheeney raises numerous constitutional challenges to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1 (1995), the "in concert" enhancement statute under which he was sentenced. Several 
principles guide the State's response to Cheeney's arguments. 
First, arguments not made in the trial courts, even constitutionally based ones, 
are waived on appeal absent a showing of "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances." State 
v. Lopez, 850 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 
(Utah App. 1991). Similarly, arguments that Utah courts should depart from federal 
interpretations in analyzing claims under analogous state constitutional provisions are also 
waived if such arguments were not articulated in the trial court. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). In this 
case, Cheeney has failed to preserve some of his constitutional challenges altogether. 
Additionally, Cheeney's trial court memorandum supporting his motion to strike the "in 
concert" statute (R. 41-48, copied in appendix II of this brief), articulated no reason to 
interpret Utah constitutional provisions differently from their federal analogues. Therefore, 
his arguments under such provisions are governed by federal constitutional law. 
Next, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will not be 
stricken unless proven invalid beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397-98 
6 
(Utah 1989); State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). Accord McMillan v. 
Pinsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (state latitude to decide substantive and procedural 
O i l . . ^ ' - • . *• ' 
burden i« ~, ~ - , ^ vuiw~ - i^ utute is attacked ^ ' *. uliy unconstitutional rather than 
unconstitutional as applied in the case at bar A fi i is J : Ii • llenge requires proof that no 
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 466 (Utah App,), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). In this 
Cheenev argues broadly that the "in concert" enhancement is unconstitutional, indicating 
fee i. i. * i utnuiiL. S. 
POINT ONE 
THE "IN CONCERT" ENHANCEMENT STATUTE DOES 
NOT CREATE A NEW CRIMINAL OFFENSE; INSTEAD, IT 
IS A LEGITIMATE SENTENCE ENHANCER THAT DOES 
NOT REQUIRE FULL TRIAL RIGHTS IN ITS APPLICATION 
In his first challenge to the "in concert" enhancement statute, Cheeney argues 
tf 
whic turns-jur\ tna -. ; n. and -o on- y 
(Br. of Appellant ai _ iyi\ ( knit v .ngiu.s ili.H i w n il 
sentencing provision, section 76-3-203.1 nevertheless requires a hearing at which full trial 
rights are honored (Br. of Appellant at 31-36). Because both challenges really assert identical 
7 
contentions about the procedures that must be followed for the statute to apply, the State 
addresses them together. 
Except for his invocation of Utah's distinctive state constitutional right to a 
preliminary hearing, which will be separately discussed, Cheeney's argument is based upon 
federal and state "due process." The relevant federal due process case is McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, All U.S. 79 (1986). In McMillan, the United States Supreme Court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania's "firearm enhancement" statute, which provides 
enhanced penalties upon conviction of certain predicate crimes when the sentencing judge, 
unaided by a jury, finds that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" while committing the 
crime. The Court also held that visible firearm possession under the enhancement statute only 
requires proof by the "preponderance of evidence" standard. 477 U.S. at 91-92. The Utah 
Supreme Court has approvingly cited McMillan in a case upholding another type of sentence 
enhancement statute. See State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1989) (approving 
enhancement for dealing drugs within 1000 feet of a public school). Utah's "in concert" 
statute, challenged by Cheeney, similarly enhances the sentence for certain enumerated crimes 
committed "in concert with" two or more other persons, as found by the trial court after the 
defendant is found guilty of the predicate crime(s). 
Under McMillan, this Court should reject Cheeney's argument that full trial-
type procedures and proof burdens are required under Utah's statute. As for Cheeney's 
complaint that section 76-3-203.1 denies a preliminary hearing on the "in concert" 
enhancement, Cheeney waived that complaint when he waived preliminary hearing. 
8 
A ,"  I i U I 2(11 ( Ihrt-s I l»LI CwMv n Nm Offnisc 
Cheeney's argument dial the "in conceit" statute creates a new offense cannot 
prevail, Cheeney's primary argument is fataII i„ II "i 11 I because he uses ti^ desired conclusion 
mp\a\m il* t^ iV ^ «- ; «u >ut 2>ueh constitutional s a ^ - i r d s as 
ptionofinno L. proof beyond reasonable doubt, MK) trial b\ an 1 ri -c ;<' ' 
type safeguards, nowever, onlv mu^i . / section M ..u.-e 
offense. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-93 & n . o \ X W J W / (once a d *it is properly 
adjudged guilty, trial-type safeguards do not apply at sentencing). 
1 - • - ^o-
3-203.1 does not prove 'that the statute creates a substantive offense, as Cheeney argues. Quite 
the contrary, the lack of such safeguards is consistent with iln u.^isLuuiu's express statement, 
ii ~ "j * * vv not create ~v separate offense but 
provides an enhanced penalty tor the T ^f **
 t.an 4"7 U.S. at 84-86, a 
similar disclaimer in the rem;, 
process review. And while the Court iii M^M^ * l*# t C4WXVJ.1V/ TT 1 V U C . W U ^iai a situation nught arise 
erein due process law would require a court to disregard a statutory disclaimer of intent to 
cre.t 
turt-v of Pei
 rf n: statute supported the 
Supreme Court's holding that it does not create a su> „ Jense, or otherwise require 
trial-f) pe procedures in • ::: i dei to appl;; I hose featui es ai e shai ed by Utah's "in concei i 
statute. Like till: .• : 1 < • • „ • i i 1 \ »raiiia statute, McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87. Utah's section 76-3-203.1 
subsection (4). Like Pennsylvania's statute, 477 U.S. at 87, section 76-3-203.1 creates no 
defendant-adverse presumptions; instead, the prosecution must first establish guilt of the 
predicate crime, and then prove the "in concert" factor. Like Pennsylvania's statute, 477 U.S. 
at 87-88, Utah's statute only raises the minimum punishment for the predicate offenses, as set 
forth in subsection (3); it does not raise the maximum punishment above the normally-
prescribed ranges. 
Finally, just as Pennsylvania's statute requires consideration of firearm 
possession as a traditional crime "instrumentality'' factor at sentencing, 477 U.S. at 89, 
section 76-3-203.1 merely specifies consideration of one of the many "circumstances of the 
crime" that traditionally are considered in criminal sentencing. A crime committed in conceit 
with others is legitimately viewed as a more serious circumstance, warranting greater 
punishment than a solo crime. The logic of this is straightforward: a group-committed crime 
is apt to do more damage. Group-committed crimes of every sort, from assault to vandalism, 
cause more harm and distress than solo crimes. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, U.S. , 113 
S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1991) (it is permissible to enhance penalties for crimes "thought to inflict 
greater individual and societal harm"). In this case, for example, it can readily be inferred 
that aided by his co-perpetrators, Cheeney was able to steal more property more quickly than 
he could have by acting alone. Therefore, just as the federal Supreme Court upheld the 
enhancement statute in McMillan, so too should this Court hold that Utah's section 76-3-203.1 
creates no new offense, but instead is a valid sentencing statute. 
Nor does Cheeney's recitation of section 76-3-203.Ts legislative history prove 
that the statute creates a separate offense. All that recitation demonstrates is that the statute 
10 
arose from t onrern ahnui "pfiiii1 related" crimr and WHS initially modelled upc - - v f . 
"anti-gangw statute (Bi of \A \ • 14) In (In i. ml, the Ui; I11 I ; ', i! ,re exprt 
decliii !;:! • ;:i t :> create any new sub ve crime, and as Cheeney demonslralc1. |Ui of Appellant 
at 12-14), crafted a statute that i* mau^uly different from the California provision. In fact, 
Utah's section 76-3-203.1 co V v :i :• rfc rence to "uaimji." Compare Cal. Penal Code §§ 
1K6 2llliiiouLi»Ii "K iWesI S. 
"street gangs," m ith apparent creation ol ireeslanding substanti *e offense with its own 
punishment in subsection 186.22(a)). 
At best rhivw y' i hislnm i\\ \n iliifioii men \\ ill mnnstrah"; Ihnt thi1 Utah 
legislature might have responded t : . • ne m \^ ^ *i \*. ; v aeMh he 
legislature cons .:-..:^ ~ :. ... _ .. . 
simply enhance the penalties for certain offenses committed by 'three or more persons. 
Cheeney makes no argument that the federal or state constitution prohibited that choice To 
the i onliaiy miilri hit Mi i v i i pinpn ' 
_._0 ion 76-3-203,1 creates a substantive offen se 
because it requires proof of the two elements that traditionally constitute tht a, 
crirn riminal act (actus reus) and a criminal mental state (mens rea' ' '2 nrt:r::!rriy 
contends that section 76-3-203 1 contains a mens rea element (Br of Appellant at : *• 
3It is irrelevant that California's "anti-gang" statutes withstood the constitutional 
challenges that concerned the Utah legislature when it enacted section 76-3-203.1 (Br. of 
Appellant at 12). Utah is not required to march lockstep with California's legislative choices. 
See McMillan, All U.S. at 90 & n.7 (constitutionality of legislation is not governed by 
whether a majority or minority of states adopts similar legislation). 
1! 1 
Again, his argument is illogical. If section 76-3-203.1 defined a crime, then it would normally 
require a mens rea of at least recklessness. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-501, 76-2-102 
(1995) ("act" and "mental state" elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt; required 
mental state is at least recklessness unless otherwise designated in definition of offense; strict 
liability offenses must be expressly so designated). However, as already explained, the statute 
by its own terms does not define a crime, and under McMillan, that disclaimer is legitimate. 
Therefore, the statute does not and need not include a mens rea. 
Citing nonbinding sister state authority, Cheeney argues that "in concert" 
includes a mens rea of "purpose," "conscious action," "intent," or "knowledge" to commit 
the predicate crime with other persons (Br. of Appellant at 17). However, two Utah Supreme 
Court cases, read together, reject Cheeney's effort to engraft a mens rea element into the 
statute, and convert it into one that creates a substantive offense. First, in State v. Moore, 782 
P.2d 497 (Utah 1989), the supreme court rejected a due process-based challenge to a statute 
that enhanced the penalty for illegal drug dealing when committed within 1000 feet of a public 
school. The "within 1000 feet" element was a strict liability provision, requiring no 
knowledge of a school's proximity. 782 P.2d at 504. Upholding the enhancement, the court 
observed that the predicate offense of drug dealing included a mens rea element. Therefore, 
there was no due process bar against enhancing the sentence based upon the "proximity" 
finding, with no additional mens rea determination: "Utah law does not require that the 
aggravating element be accompanied by a mens rea. Therefore, [the statute], which eliminates 
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lack of knowledge about the aggravating factor's presence as a defense for the enhanced 
penalty, does not violate due process." Id. at 505. 
Second, in State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994), the court implicitly 
rejected the proposition that in order for Utah's "in concert" enhancement to apply, the 
defendant's actions in concert with others must be attended by any mens rea besides that 
required for the predicate offense-in that case, intentional murder. Defendant Alvarez argued 
that in order for the enhancement to apply, those with whom he had acted must necessarily 
have also acted intentionally. The supreme court expressly rejected that argument, holding 
that Utah's rules for party liability, incorporated into subsection 76-3-203.1(b) of the 
enhancement statute, do not require an identical mens rea among the criminal actors. 872 
P.2d at 461. Because the evidence supported a finding that the others who acted with 
defendant Alvarez all possessed some level of criminal mens rea, the court upheld his 
enhanced sentence. Id. at 462. 
The court in Alvarez then observed that the defendant himself had been found 
guilty of the predicate offense, which required a "knowing and intentional" mens rea. Id. 
That observation implies a determination that the defendant's mens rea for the predicate 
offense is the only mens rea that the defendant must have in order for the "in concert" 
enhancement to apply; he or she need not have an additional intent to commit the offense with 
others. That determination is consistent with the court's earlier holding in Moore: so long as 
the predicate offense with its requisite mens rea is established, an additional "enhancer" or 
"aggravator" does not require proof of an additional mens rea element. 
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Therefore, section 76-3-203.1 requires no additional proof of Cheeney's mens 
rea. He admitted a criminal mental state when he pleaded guilty to the predicate offenses of 
burglary and theft ("intent to commit a felony or theft," burglary, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1995); "purpose to deprive," theft, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995)). Under Moore and 
Alvarez, no further proof of mens rea was required to enhance Cheeney's sentence under the 
"gang enhancement" statute.4 
Even if this Court accepted Cheeney's argument that the "in concert" 
enhancement requires a separate mens rea from the predicate offense, it would not follow that 
such mens rea can only be found by full trial-type procedures. Not every fact inquiry in a 
criminal proceeding requires a jury, or proof beyond reasonable doubt. McMillan, All U.S. 
at 92-93. Criminal courts routinely find facts necessary for the admission of evidence without 
jury assistance, and by proof standards below the "reasonable doubt" standard. See, e.g., 
Utah R. Evid. 104 (facts supporting admission of evidence). The facts thus found include 
assessment of a person's mental state. See, e.g., State v. Carter 888 P.2d 629, 641 (Utah) 
(determination that confession is voluntary; preponderance of evidence standard), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 163 (1995); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah App. 1991) 
(voluntariness of search consent), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Some facts in 
criminal proceedings must be found by the court, not by jury. State and Graham v. Payne, 
892 P.2d 1032 (Utah) (facts to decide criminal jurisdiction), cert, denied, U.S. , 116 
4It is also this Court's duty to construe statutes in a way that avoids constitutional 
problems. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). Cheeney invites this Court to add 
elements to the "in concert" statute in order to create constitutional problems. This Court 
should decline. 
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S. Ct. 178 (1995). Therefore, even if "in concert" encompasses a mens rea, this would not 
convert the enhancement into a separate offense, nor otherwise require full trial-type 
procedures in order to validly apply. 
B. Section 76-3-203.1 Requires Only the Minimal Process that is Due 
for Sentencing Proceedings. 
Because section 76-3-203.1 is a sentencing statute only, the procedure by which 
it applies is relaxed; put another way, far less "process" is "due" for sentencing than for trial 
on a substantive criminal charge. This is so because once found guilty, the defendant's liberty 
can legitimately be restricted to the degree normally prescribed for his or her offense. 
McMillan, 411 U.S. at 91-93 & n.8. Noncapital sentencing within an offense's prescribed 
range is traditionally a matter of trial court discretion; procedurally, little more than notice and 
opportunity to be heard is required. See State v. Bell 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988) 
(sentencing under "minimum mandatory" statutes entails a relatively informal procedure); 
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978) ("the basic provisions afforded by our law to 
persons accused of crime do not exist in the same manner after he has been convicted"). 
There is no constitutional right to sentencing by jury. Prqffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 
(1976). The rules of evidence do not apply; only "reasonably reliable and relevant 
information" is required. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
authority); Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(3); Carter, 888 P.2d at 646 n.20. 
Only minimum procedures, to assure fairness and reasonable exercise of trial 
court discretion, are required at sentencing. An informal hearing is held; defendant has a right 
to be present and a right to counsel. Any written reports, such as presentence reports, must be 
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disclosed so that the defendant can challenge any information contained therein. However, the 
author(s) of such reports need not appear unless specifically called by a party, and if personal 
safety concerns warrant, the identity of sentencing informants may be withheld. State v. 
Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986); State v. Anderson, 632 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982). By statute and rule, the defendant may 
give his or her own statement, and present evidence in mitigation of sentence. See generally 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5) through -(7) (Supp. 1995); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).5 
By no stretch of imagination can Utah's "gang enhancement" statute be viewed 
as denying the foregoing sentencing procedure. In fact, that procedure was followed in this 
case. Cheeney had a sentencing hearing (R. 131-44). Aided by counsel, Cheeney challenged 
portions of the presentence report (R. 133-34), and cited his intelligence level and his troubled 
psychiatric history in mitigation (R. 136-37). He was invited to personally address the court 
(R. 138-40). Cheeney did not contest the "in concert" factual predicate for the section 76-3-
203.1 enhancement, probably because he had already admitted it when he pleaded guilty (R. 
125). However, through counsel he did urge that he had not been the "ringleader" in the 
burglary and theft, thereby at least tacitly requesting that the court suspend the enhancement as 
permitted under subsection 76-3-203.1(6). Finally, the imposed sentences did not exceed the 
5Cheeney's citation of Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) (Br. of 
Appellant at 34-35), addressing state constitutional due process in parole hearings, cannot be 
read as expanding due process rights at judicial sentencing. State v. Wedge, 293 Or. 598, 652 
P.2d 773 (1982) (Br. of Appellant 35-36), holding that the factual predicate for applying a 
firearm enhancement must be decided by full trial-type proceedings, runs counter to McMillan 
(1986) on state constitutional grounds. Therefore, Wedge and other Oregon cases could only 
serve as weak justification for a departing analysis under the Utah Constitution~an analysis 
that, as already explained, Cheeney has not preserved for appeal. 
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zero-to-five and one-to-fifteen basic sentences for the pleaded-to third and second degree 
felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995): he received a six-to-fifteen year 
sentence on the greater charge, concurrent with the three-to-five years enhanced sentence on 
the lesser (R. 91-94). Therefore, not only does Cheeney's facial due process-based attack 
upon section 76-3-203.1 fail; he does not even mount a plausible "as applied" challenge. 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), relied upon by Cheeney (Br. of 
Appellant at 32-33), does not demand a different result. As the Supreme Court explained in 
McMillan, All U.S. at 88-89, Specht involved a state sentencing scheme that allowed a 
sentencing court to increase a guilty defendant's maximum ten-year sentence to indefinite 
imprisonment up to life, based only on a presentence psychiatric report, without notice or 
meaningful hearing. As just explained, in this case Cheeney had a sentencing hearing at which 
he challenged the State's evidence and made his argument for leniency. Therefore, this case 
does not even come close to suffering the due process deficiency that existed in Specht.6 In 
sum, Cheeney's due process-based challenges to section 76-3-203.1 all fail. 
C. Section 76-3-203.1 Does Not Deny a Preliminary Hearing. 
The State finally addresses Cheeney's argument that section 76-3-203.1 denies 
his distinctive state right, under article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution, to a preliminary 
hearing (Br. of Appellant at 21-22). Cheeney's argument founders, most fundamentally 
because he was not denied a preliminary hearing; instead, he affirmatively waived his 
6Further, as explained earlier, Cheeney's sentence was not increased above the 
normally prescribed maximums for his predicate offenses. Therefore, Specht is 
distinguishable both by process and outcome from this case and from McMillan. 
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preliminary hearing (R. 4, 23-24, copied in appendix HI of this brief). By its very terms, 
article I, section 13 permits such waiver (quoted in Br. of Appellant at 21). Having thus 
exercised his constitutional option to waive preliminary hearing, Cheeney can only speculate 
that had a preliminary hearing been held, he would not have been allowed to challenge the 
State's evidence, or to introduce his own evidence, relevant to the "in concert" enhancement. 
In other words, Cheeney again fails to demonstrate an "as applied" constitutional defect in 
section 76-3-203.1. And because he has not shown an unconstitutional application of the 
statute to him, Cheeney cannot prove that the statute is facially unconstitutional. 
Nor could he make such proof in any event. On its face, the statute appears to 
allow an "in concert" inquiry at preliminary hearing. Subsection (2)(b) of the statute permits 
post-preliminary hearing amendment of the criminal information to add the enhancement. 
That permission, however, is contingent upon adequate prior notice of the "in concert" 
allegation, or upon determination that the defendant will not be prejudiced by the amendment.7 
By implication, if those conditions are not met, an "in conceit" enhancement can only be 
added if a new information is filed and a new preliminary hearing is held. This amendment 
process is fully consistent with the trial court's regular discretion to permit amendment of an 
7Subsection (2)(b) states: 
If the ["in concert"] subscription is not included initially, the court may 
subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the allegation he 
committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, or if the court finds 
the defendant has not otherwise been substantially prejudiced by the omission. 
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information during trial or post-verdict. See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d); Bell, 785 P.2d at 395.8 
Therefore, section 76-3-203.1, reasonably construed, does not deny a preliminary hearing on 
the "in concert" enhancement. Like Cheeney's due process challenges, Cheeney's complaint 
about preliminary hearing denial therefore fails. 
POINT TWO 
SECTION 76-3-203.1 IS NOT VAGUE, PROPERLY 
PRESERVES JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION, AND 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Cheeney next raises a due process "vagueness" challenge to section 76-3-203.1, 
and argues that it grants too much discretion to the sentencing court. He also argues that the 
"in concert" enhancement "interferes with sensitive First Amendment freedoms" (Br. of 
Appellant at 23-30). His arguments lack merit. 
A. The Statute is Not Vague. 
As Cheeney observes, a statute must be sufficiently clear to "give the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly." Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). Cheeney admitted 
in the trial court that subsection 76-3-203.1(4) gives adequate notice of the predicate offenses 
8Rule 4(d) states: 
The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time 
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial 
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or 
information may be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as 
to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts. 
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for which the "in concert" enhancement applies (R. 47, appendix II of this brief). On appeal, 
he alleges two vagueness problems with other subsections. 
Cheeney first argues that "in concert," is a "puzzling concept," particularly 
since the parties with whom the defendant acts need not be identified or charged. See §§ 76-2-
203.1(l)(a), -(5)(b) (Br. of Appellant at 24-25). He did not make this argument in the trial 
court (see R. 43-44, 47-48, appendix II). He does not argue "plain error" or "exceptional 
circumstances" on appeal. Therefore, this part of Cheeney's "vagueness" argument is waived 
(more precisely, defaulted) on appeal. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Even if not waived, it strains credulity to suggest that "in conceit" and 
"unidentified or uncharged other persons" are "puzzling" concepts. The enhancement statute 
defines "in concert" by express incorporation of Utah's criminal party liability statute, in 
subsection 76-3-203.l(l)(b); Cheeney does not contend that the party liability statute is vague. 
Furthermore, in this case Cheeney's co-perpetrators were neither unidentified nor uncharged; 
Cheeney himself identified them when he confessed to police, and both co-perpetrators were 
charged (R. 8, 12). Therefore he has no complaint that the "in concert" enhancement was 
vague as applied to him, because the "unidentified or uncharged" provision did not apply in 
his case. In addition, because the meanings of "unidentified" and "uncharged" are self-
evident, the "in concert" enhancement is not facially vague. 
Cheeney's second "vagueness" contention is that the "in concert" enhancement 
statute fails to reveal its true purpose. Based upon the statute's legislative history, described 
earlier, Cheeney asserts that it "is intended to be enforced in select cases involving gangs and 
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is intended to target ganglords" (Br. of Appellant at 25). That assertion is without merit, 
because the enhancement statute contains no reference to "gangs." It merely addresses "in 
concert" crimes~a concept that, as just explained, puts normally intelligent persons on 
adequate notice of the conditions that will trigger the enhancement. Because the statute is 
unambiguous on its face, it is unnecessary and improper to use legislative history to interpret 
it. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 n.14 (Utah 1994). The statute plainly enhances 
penalties for crimes committed "in concert" with others. Nothing more (and nothing less) 
may be read into it. 
B. The Statute Legitimately Permits Limited Judicial Discretion in its 
Application. 
Cheeney next complains that the "in concert" enhancement "permits the judge 
to apply or suspend application of the statute at whim" (Br. of Appellant at 27). In other 
words, he asserts that the statute grants too much discretion to sentencing judges-even though 
noncapital sentencing, by settled law, is a matter of broad discretion. State v. Peterson, 681 
P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984). But reasonably read in its totality, the statute does not allow 
sentencing by "whim."9 Under subsection 76-3-203.l(l)(a), a crime committed in concert 
with two or more others is subject to the enhanced penalty; subsection (5)(c) makes the 
enhancement contingent upon the "in concert" finding; and subsection (6)(a) provides that 
notwithstanding such finding, the sentencing judge "may suspend" the enhancement "required 
under this section," provided that he or she state the reasons therefor (emphasis added). 
9A "whim" is a "[p]assing fancy; an impulse or caprice." Black's*Law Dictionary 
1431 (5th Ed. 1979). 
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The foregoing statutory language actually cabins the sentencing judge's 
discretion by creating a strong presumption that once the "in concert" condition is found to 
exist, the enhancement will apply (it is "required"). The presumed enhancement can be 
suspended only if the judge makes an articulated determination that the "interests of justice" 
support suspension. (Any vagueness in the term "interests of justice" actually aids the 
defendant, who may interpret it broadly to introduce whatever mitigating evidence he or she 
believes should apply.) Once more, a single legislator's statement in debating the statute (Br. 
of Appellant at 26) is unnecessary to the analysis. Based upon the plain statutory language, 
the judge's "whim" has no play; instead, limited discretion is the rule. 
There is, of course, no constitutional problem with this rule. Utah courts have 
consistently rejected constitutional challenges to Utah's three-tiered minimum mandatory 
sentence scheme for certain offenses. Under that scheme, the middle of the three available 
punishments applies, unless the sentencing judge articulates reasons to impose the lowest or 
the highest minimum mandatory term for the designated offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(6) (Supp. 1995); State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1988) (discretion is granted 
under the three-tiered scheme); State v.Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987) (three-tiered 
scheme is not vague). The similarly limited judicial discretion to impose the "in concert" 
enhancement is therefore proper, both as applied to Cheeney and as a facial matter.10 
10In the trial court, Cheeney argued that section 76-3-203.1 "allows prosecutors 
exceedingly broad authority to charge the gang enhancement. . ." (R. 44). On appeal, he 
does not pursue that argument, which would in any event fail under Wayte v. United States, 
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985), State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 402 (Utah 1989), and State v. Geer, 
765 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989) (all holding that so 
long as probable cause exists, prosecutorial charging decisions are a matter of discretion). 
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C. The Statute Does Not Impair First Amendment Rights. 
Cheeney finally makes the frivolous allegation that the "in concert" 
enhancement infringes upon First Amendment "associational" right-that is, "the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
U.S. Const. Amend. I. The foregoing First Amendment text, by itself, defeats this claim. The 
amendment permits "peaceable" assembly, not assembly to commit crimes. Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951). 
To the extent Cheeney really alleges "overbreadth"~a claim related to 
vagueness, see Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 928--his allegation also fails. A statute is overbroad 
if it proscribes (or could be understood to proscribe) a substantial amount of conduct that is 
protected by the First Amendment, and thereby "chills" the exercise of First Amendment 
rights. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984); State v. Murphy, 61A P.2d 1220, 
1222 (Utah 1983). Section 76-3-203.1 does not proscribe any protected conduct, because it 
cannot apply until the defendant is found guilty of a predicate criminal offense. Even then, the 
enhancement does not apply merely because the defendant associates with a particular group of 
persons. Cf. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992) (membership in 
racist organization, by itself, cannot be used as basis to enhance criminal penalty). Instead, 
the enhancement only applies if the defendant acted with others who also "would be criminally 
liable as parties" to the predicate offense, § 76-3-203.l(l)(b). In fact, by avoiding any effort 
to criminalize "gang" association per se, the statute avoids any risk of outlawing protected 
associational conduct. Therefore, Cheeney's First Amendment-based challenge, like his 
"vagueness" and "excessive discretion" arguments, should be rejected. 
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POINT THREE 
CHEENEY CANNOT PROVE THAT SECTION 76-3-203.1 
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION OR "UNIFORM 
OPERATION OF LAWS" PRINCIPLES 
In his final point on appeal, Cheeney argues that section 76-3-203.1 violates 
federal "equal protection" and state "uniform operation of laws" principles (Br. of Appellant 
at 37-39). See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1; Utah Const. Art. I § 24. In the trial court, 
Cheeney nominally alluded to these constitutional provisions (R. 43, appendix II of this brief). 
However, he did not develop an argument under them. Therefore, his argument on appeal is 
waived. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). 
Even if his appellate argument were preserved, it lacks merit. In large 
measure, Cheeney's argument would fail because it relies upon false premises. For example, 
he assumes that the enhancement statute applies without appropriate procedural safeguards, 
and that it penalizes First Amendment associational rights (Br. of Appellant at 40). He 
assumes that the statute is only intended to target "organized gang members" or to "get 
ganglords off the streets" (id. at 41, 42). He assumes that the statute applies without a 
preliminary hearing (id.). He assumes that the persons who commit the enumerated predicate 
crimes have some kind of "liberty interest" against the "in concert" enhancement (Br. of 
Appellant at 40). As already explained in this brief, all those assumptions are false. 
The only new premise that would bear mention under this point is Cheeney's 
claim that the class of persons created by operation of section 76-3-203-guilty defendants who 
committed their crimes in concert with two or more others-is constitutionally "suspect." This 
premise, for which Cheeney offers no supporting authority, appears frivolous. The class of 
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"group criminals" certainly bears no resemblance to traditional "suspect classifications," 
defined by race or gender-classifications typically based upon a person's inherent 
characteristics. Instead, the class is created by volitional, criminal behavior-which must be 
established by legal process as already described in this brief. 
Because no "suspect classification" is created by the statute, application of the 
"in concert" sentence enhancement to class members need only rationally relate to a legitimate 
state interest in order to be valid. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398-400 (Utah 1989). As 
already explained, group crime causes more harm than solo crime. The State has a legitimate 
interest in deterring the greater harm done by group crime. This interest is rationally served 
by providing an enhanced penalty for group crime. 
Finally, it might bear note that the differential sentence treatment between solo 
criminals and those who commit crimes in conceit with others is not so dramatic as other 
differential treatment that sometimes triggers judicial inquiry. As already explained, the "in 
concert" enhancement does not expand the regular prescribed sentencing range for the 
predicate offense(s). Neither the solo defendant nor the "in concert" defendant has any legally 
cognizable expectation of leniency within that range. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah 
1981) ("there is no principle recognized in a court of law that one who would breach the law 
is entitled to a free bite of the apple or to be treated leniently"). Thus the differing disposition 
for the "in concert" enhancement and the non-enhanced sentence really does not warrant 
intrusive equal protection or "uniform operation" review. Compare State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 
991, 998 (Utah 1995) (decision to prosecute juvenile defendant in juvenile or adult court 
causes dramatic dispositional differences). Therefore, besides having been waived by trial 
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court default, Cheeney's equal protection challenge to Utah's "in concert" sentence 
enhancement statute would fail on its merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Cheeney's enhanced sentences should be 
AFFIRMED. A published opinion would be appropriate to dispel any doubt about the 
constitutionality of section 76-3-203.1; the State does not request oral argument. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
("In Concert" Sentence Enhancement) 
76-3-203.1 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert 
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) I n concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, 
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or 
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice 
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subse-
quently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, 
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
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(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-
6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title 
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses tinder Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety 
Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
History: C1953,76-3-203.1, eiuicted by L. xnent, effective May 2,1994, corrected the ref-
1990, ch. 207,1 1; 1994, ch. 12,1 108. erence in Subsection (lXa). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS of the enhanced penalty as it was obliged to do 
under this section, failure of defendant to object 
Findings of fact to the enhancement precluded consideration of 
Mental f tat* of parties. the issue on appeal. State v. Labrum, 246 Utah 
Findings of fret. A*r« *** U (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
Even though the trial court did not make Mental state of parties. 
written findings offset concerning applicability For this section to apply, a defendant must 
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MOTION TO STRIKE 
GANG ENHANCEMENT 
Case No. _9513J21£i)8FgJ> 
951901609F5 
;iyui5ToFs c 
Defendant. Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Comes now CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY, by and through counsel, REBECCA 
HYDE, and hereby moves this Court to strike the gang enhancement 
statute. This motion is supported by the attached memorandum. 
Respectfully submitted this /H day of September . 1995. 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing motion to the Deputy District Attorney, at the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on the day of September 1995. 
uOO 
REBECCA C. HYDE (6409) 
Attorney for Attorney 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
FILED 0SSTRECT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 1 5 1995 
Deputy Cltrk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 






Case No. 951901608FS 
951901609FS 
951901610FS 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
FACTS 
The Utah gang enhancement statute imposes 
significantly increased minimum sentences for several specified 
offenses, in cases wherein the offenses are committed by at least 
three people acting as accomplices, Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-
203.1. A copy of the statute and the legislative history of the 
statute is attached to this memo. 
ARGUMENT 
In State v. Blowers. 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to apply the motor 
vehicle code provisions to people riding animals on the roadways, 
0 0 0 0 4 J 
because the statute violated state and federal constitutional 
protections against vague penal laws. Ld. at 1322-1323, In 
doing this, the Court explained, 
Section 41-6-15 provides: "Every person 
riding an animal or driving any animal-
drawn vehicle upon a roadway is subject 
to this chapter, except those provisions 
which by their nature can have no 
application." This is a classic example 
of a criminal statute that is too vague 
in its prohibitions to survive due 
process challenge. It is impossible for 
anyone to determine, even upon 
thoughtful reflection, which portions of 
the vehicle code the legislature thought 
should apply to animals and animal-drawn 
vehicles and which should not. In fact, 
the very wording of the section suggests 
that the legislature had no firm idea as 
to what it meant. Section 41-6-14 does 
not give anyone proper notice of the 
conduct it intends to proscribe and 
certainly does nothing to cure the 
vagueness problems inherent in section 
41-6-44. 
Id. at 1323. In a concurring opinion, Justice Howe wrote, 
Due process of law requires that the 
legislature provide sufficiently precise 
standards to guide a judge and jury in 
deciding whether a crime has been 
committed. Failure to do so may well 
constitute an unlawful delegation of 
legislative power. 
The power to define crimes is legislative in character; it 
may not be delegated to the courts. A statute which 
delegates legislative power to the judiciary violates a 
constitutional mandate for separation of powers. 
• « • • 
It would certainly be dangerous if the 
legislature could set a net large enough 
to catch all possible offenders, and 
leave it to the courts to step inside 
and say who could be rightfully 
detained, and who should be set at 
large. This would, to some extent, 
substitute the judicial for the 
legislative department of the 
government. 
Id. at 1323-1324 (citations omitted. 
As is discussed below, the gang enhancement statute is another 
prime example of vague legislation, wherein the legislature has 
delegated to courts the responsibility of deciding when this law 
will apply. 
The gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional in four main 
respects: the statute fails to adequately channel prosecutorial 
and judicial discretion; the statute fails to meet the 
legislative purpose in a rational manner; the statute impinges on 
various rights unique to criminal defendants; and the statute is 
too vague to forewarn citizens about the criminal consequences of 
their actions. 
1. Vagueness - failure to channel prosecutorial and judicial 
discretion 
Due process of law requires the legislature to enact laws 
which are sufficiently definite to confine the discretion of law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges. Kolendar v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Laws must be sufficiently narrow 
in scope that police officers, prosecutors and judges are not 
allowed to discriminate in their application. E.g. Constitution 
of Utah, Article I section 2, Article I section 24 (equal 
protection, uniform operation of laws provisions). Courts are 
especially careful to scrutinize legislation which might impinge 
on basic First Amendment freedoms such as freedom of speech, 
rights to assembly and rights to association. IcJ. See also 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 1 (defining similar but 
different rights under Utah Constitution). Under Utah 
Constitutional standards, it is extremely important for the 
legislature to narrow the scope of criminal statutes, so that 
laws do not delegate the legislative function to actors from 
other government branches. E.g. Constitution of Utah, Article V 
section 1 (separation of powers provision). 
The gang enhancement statute allows prosecutors exceedingly 
broad authority to charge the gang enhancement because the 
statute applies regardless of whether the parties other than the 
defendant are even identified, let alone prosecuted 
commensurately with the defendant. Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-
203.1(5) (b). 
The gang enhancement statute gives judges virtually unbridled 
discretion to decide which enhanceable offenses are actually 
punished under the enhancement, by allowing the suspension of the 
gang enhancement if the judge finds that the interests of justice 
are served thereby, and states findings on the record to such 
effect. Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(6). 
As is true of all vague laws, the vague provisions of the gang^ -
enhancement statute can be used improperly by government actors 
who might be consciously or subconsciously inclined to 
discriminate against certain classes of individuals, or to 
impinge upon citizens' rights to association, free speech, and 
other related rights. E.g. Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 
104, 108-109 (1972). Inasmuch as the courts are empowered to 
protect those most vulnerable to governmental discrimination and 
overreaching, see United States v. Carolene Products Company. 304 
U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938), this Court should use its authority 
to strike the gang enhancement statute. 
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2. Due process - lack of rational relationship between law and 
legislative goal 
Under Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
legislation must meet the legislative purpose in a rational 
manner. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988). A review 
of the legislative history of the gang enhancement statute 
demonstrates that the legislature intentionally enacted statutory 
language designed by its drafters to obfuscate the legislative 
intent, and that the legislature included the broad judicial 
discretion provision as the mechanism whereby the statute would 
hopefully apply as intended. 
The legislative purpose of the gang enhancement statute was to 
deter hard core California gang members from migrating to Utah to 
franchise crack cocaine. Legislative history, at 1-9. It is 
readily apparent to anyone reading the language of the statute 
that the actual applicability of the statute is far different 
from that intended by the legislature. Review of the legislative 
history explains the discrepancy and highlights the 
unconstitutionality of the provision. 
The drafters of the statute omitted explicit reference to 
gangs or the real purpose of the statute in the statutory 
language, in hopes of avoiding constitutional challenges to the 
statute. Legislative history at 2-3, 8-9. The legislative 
history demonstrates that the legislature was counting on the 
judiciary to apply the statute in a manner as to effectuate the 
true legislative intent. The legislators participating in the 
debate on the statute indicated their concern that the gang 
enhancement should only apply to true gang members, rather than 
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to non-gang-related crimes involving multiple participants. The 
sponsor of the bill informed them that that concern was addressed 
in the section of the statute giving total discretion to judges 
on the applicability of the statute. Legislative history at 6. 
Because the gang enhancement statute does not meet the 
legislative purpose in a rational manner, but in fact relies on 
an unconstitutional judicial discretion provision to effectuate 
legislative intent, this Court should strike the statute. 
3. Impingement on rights of criminal defendants 
The gang enhancement statute purports to allow for the 
imposition of significant minimum terms of imprisonment for 
specific criminal conduct, while explicitly evading numerous 
standard constitutional rights of criminal defendants, including 
the right to a preliminary hearing for a determination of 
probable cause, e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 13; 
the right to a trial by jury, e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article 
I section 12; and the right to a finding of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, e.g. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. 
The legislature should not be allowed to create such extreme 
punitive consequences for criminal conduct, in circumvention of 
these fundamental rights. 
The fact that the legislature characterizes the statute as 
creating "enhancements," rather than as defining offenses, Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(5)(a), should not override 
fundamental constitutional rights of criminal defendants.1 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court has already differed with 
legislature's characterization of the provision as an 
"enhancement." In State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994) , the 
00004« 
Section 76-3-203-1 purports to penalize stated criminal acts 
combined with specified mental states, and as such, the statute 
defines offenses. Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-101 et. seq. See 
also State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982)(recognizing 
that "enhancement" statute actually defined elements of a crime, 
which should be assessed by a jury). Because the statute 
attempts to circumvent constitutional rights to preliminary 
hearings, jury trials, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this 
Court should strike the statute. 
4. Vagueness - lack of warning to citizens 
Due process of law requires the legislature to enact laws 
which are sufficiently clear to inform citizens about how to 
conform their conduct to the law. E.g. United States 
Constitution, Amendment XIV; Grayned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 
U.S. 104 (1972). 
Cheeney concedes that the average citizen likely has knowledge 
of the unlawful nature of the conduct encompassed in the offenses 
subject to enhancement and listed under subsection (4). However, 
the average citizen is unlikely to know whether the conduct at 
issue is subject to such extreme sentencing enhancement because 
the statute grants virtually unlimited discretion to the judge to 
determine whether the enhancement applies. See Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-3-203.1(6) (allowing the judge to suspend the 
application of the gang enhancement as long as the judge finds 
that "the interests of justice would be best served" and states 
court noted that the provision creates minimum mandatory sentences, 
rather than true enhancements. 
findings to this effect on the record). 
The broad applicability of the enhancement compounds the risk 
that the average citizen would have little forewarning as to the 
applicability of the enhancement. See Utah Code Ann. section 76-
3-203.1(5)(b) (the statute applies regardless of whether the 
other person(s) acting in concert with the defendant "are not 
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of 
those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or 
lesser offense."). The Utah appellate courts interpret the 
statute as applying regardless of whether the parties share the 
same mens rea. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 905 n.9 (Utah App. 1994). This 
further promotes the possibility that someone could suffer the 
consequences of the gang enhancement statute without fair 
forewarning. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should strike Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-3-203.1. 
Respectfully submitted this f^j day^of September. 1995. 
5E 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing motion to the Deputy District Attorney, at the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on the day of September. 1995. 
DELIVERED BY 
SEP 1 5 1995 
VIOADFR 
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Waiver of Preliminary Hearing 




THURSDAY AUGUST 31, 1995 
8:46 AM 
SLP Case: 951001082 FS 
Agency No.: 94-141688 
State Felony 
01/95 HRG DSP scheduled for 8/22/95 at 2:00 P in room ? with SKM ILR 
PRE on 8/ 3/95 was cancelled BLR 
L9/95 DEFT PLED NOT GUILTY. BLR 
22/95 DEVER/BR T 1900 C2600 DEFT NOT TRANSPORTED FROM THE PRISON AS BLR 
REQUESTED, CASE CONTINUED. REBECCA HYDE PRESENT ON BEHALF OF BLR 
THE DEFT, ROGER BLAYLOCK PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE. BLR 
PRISON NOTIFIED OF NEW DATE. BLR 
HRG DSP scheduled for 8/29/95 at 2:00 P in room ? with SKM BLR 
59/95 Arraignment scheduled on April 07 , 1995 at 09:00 am BLR 
before Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK in courtroom 503 BLR 
Arraignment scheduled on September 08 , 1995 at 09:00 am BLR 
before Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK in courtroom 503 BLR 
DEVER/BR T 1908 C 210 DPW REBECCA HYDE, KEN UPDEGROVE PRESENT ON BLR 
BEHALF OF THE STATE. DEFT WAIVED HIS PRELIMINARY HEARING, BLR 
THE STATE CONSENTING THERETO. DEFT ADVISED OF HIS RIGHTS. BLR 
C/O DEFT BOUND OVER TO DISTRICT COURT. BLR 
DEFT IN PRISON. BLR 
DEFT ARRAIGNED AND WAIVED READING OF THE INFORMATION. BLR 
0/95 Judge ID changed from TPC to SKM BLR 
































Bound Over District 
Bound Over District 
Bound Over District 
Bound Over District 
Bound Over District 
Bound Over District 
Bound Over District 
Bound Over District 
1/95 Case transferred to District Court. 
Citation Amount: 






























































Atty for Plaintiff 
UPDEGROVE, KENT 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
REBECCA C. HYDE, (#6409) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 





MOTION TO CONTINUE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Case No. 941022189FS, 
951000404FS and 951001082FS 
JUDGE SHEILA K. MCCLEVE 
The defendant, CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY, by and through his 
attorney, REBECCA C. HYDE, hereby moves the Court for a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing, in the above-entitled 
matter now set for August 3, 1995 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. on the 
grounds that defendant anticipates a waiver and requests this 
matter be set for disposition in two weeks. 
DATED this / day of August, 1995. 
Respectfully Si 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant 
STIPULATION 
I , KEN UPDEGROVE, Deputy D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y , hereElMJudbalDistrict 
000023 
stipulates to the foregoing Motion to Continue Preliminary 
Hearing in the above-entitled case. 
DATED this //J^ day of August, 1995. 
KEN UPDEGRO^ 
Deputy District Attorney 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion for Continuance 
to the District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, this ( day of August, 1995 
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